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A B S T R A C T
Practitioners frequently inform us that variable ‘total details’ is not suitable for lie detection purposes in real life interviews. 
Practitioners cannot count the number of details in real time and the threshold of details required to classify someone as 
a truth teller or a lie teller is unknown. The authors started to address these issues by examining three new verbal veracity 
cues: complications, common knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies. We present a meta-analysis regarding 
these three variables and compared the results with ‘total details’. Truth tellers reported more details (d = 0.28 to d = 0.45) and 
more complications (d = 0.51 to d = 0.62) and fewer common knowledge details (d = -0.40 to d = -0.46) and self-handicapping 
strategies (d = -0.37 to d = -0.50) than lie tellers. Complications was the best diagnostic veracity cue. The findings were similar 
for the initial free recall and the second recall in which only new information was examined. Four moderators (scenario, 
motivation, modality, and interview technique) did not affect the results. As a conclusion, complications in particular appear 
to be a good veracity indicator but more research is required. We included suggestions for such research.
La relación de las complicaciones, los detalles de observación común y las 
estrategias de autojustificación con la veracidad: un meta-análisis
R E S U M E N
Los profesionales dicen con frecuencia que la variable “detalles totales” es adecuada para la detección de mentiras en las 
entrevistas de la vida real. No pueden contar el número de detalles en tiempo real y se desconoce el umbral de detalles 
necesario para clasificar a alguien como sincero o mentiroso. Los autores comenzaron a abordar estos temas analizando tres 
nuevos indicadores verbales de veracidad: las complicaciones, los detalles de conocimiento público y las estrategias de falta 
de capacidad. Se presenta un meta-análisis de estas tres variables y se comparan los resultados con los “detalles totales”. Los 
sujetos que dicen la verdad dan más detalles (d = 0.28 hasta d = 0.45) y complicaciones (d = 0.51 hasta d = 0.62) y menos de-
talles de conocimiento público (d = -0.40 hasta d = -0.46) y estrategias de justificación (d = -0.37 hasta d = -0.50) que los que 
mienten. Las complicaciones resultaron ser el mejor indicador diagnóstico de veracidad. Los resultados fueron iguales en la 
primera entrevista en recuerdo libre y en la segunda entrevista, en la que solo se analizaba información nueva. No influyeron 
en los resultados cuatro moderadores: el escenario, la motivación, la modalidad y la técnica de entrevista. Como conclusión, 
las complicaciones parecen ser un buen indicador de veracidad aunque es necesaria más investigación. Se discuten las futu-
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From verbal cues to deception that have been frequently 
examined, total details emerged as the best diagnostic cue (Amado 
et al., 2016). Truth tellers typically report more details than lie 
tellers (d = 0.55), representing a medium effect size. However, 
practitioners frequently tell us that variable total details is not 
useful to them, mainly for two reasons: 1) it is not possible to count 
the number of details in an interview in real time and 2) it can 
never be established in an individual interview how many details 
are required to judge somebody as a truth teller or lie teller. Vrij 
et al. (2017) started to address these two problems by introducing 
three new verbal veracity cues: complications, common knowledge 
details, and self-handicapping strategies. To date they have 
published 18 samples measuring complications, 12 samples 
measuring common knowledge details, and 13 samples examining 
self-handicapping strategies. In this article we present a meta-
analysis of that research. This meta-analysis has three aims: to 
determine the diagnostic value of these three cues to differentiate 
truth tellers from lie tellers; to assess the gaps in knowledge 
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concerning these three cues; and to encourage other researchers to 
examine these and other cues.
Complications, Common Knowledge Details, and Self-
Handicapping Strategies
Complications are occurrences that affecs the story-teller and 
make a situation more complex (“Initially we did not see our friend, 
as he was waiting at a different entrance”) (Vrij, Deeb et al., 2021). 
Complications are thought to occur more often in truthful statements 
than in deceptive statements. Making up complications requires 
imagination but lie tellers may not have adequate imagination to 
fabricate these (Köhnken, 2004; Vrij, 2008). In addition, lie tellers 
prefer to keep their stories simple (Hartwig et al., 2007), but adding 
complications makes the story more complex. Complications as 
introduced by Vrij and colleagues differs from the unexpected 
complications criterion that is part of the Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis (CBCA) tool (Amado et al., 2016). The main difference is 
that in CBCA complications are necessarily unexpected occurrences, 
whereas this is not the case in Vrij and colleagues’ definition. Thus, 
when someone says that when driving from their hometown A to 
their holiday destination C they briefly visited town B, this visit 
to town B is considered a complication by Vrij and colleagues 
but not according to the CBCA definition. In other words, Vrij and 
colleagues’ definition solely focuses on ‘complexity’ without taking 
any unexpected elements into account. A second, less important, 
difference is how the coding takes place. Vrij and colleagues always 
apply frequency coding whereas CBCA-coders often use scales 
(3-point or 5-point scales) (Vrij, 2008). Frequency coding is more 
detailed and probably more reliable than scale coding.
Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical 
information about events (“The event had an Oscars theme so 
everybody was dressed up”). Lie tellers are thought to report more 
common knowledge details than truth tellers. Truth tellers have 
personal experiences of an event and are likely to report these 
(DePaulo et al., 1996). If lie tellers do not have personal experiences 
of the event they report or do not have experiences of events related 
to the to-be-discussed event, they will draw upon general knowledge 
to construe the event (Sporer, 2016). Common knowledge details 
have never been examined before in deception research. Deception 
researchers have discussed scripts, without actually examining them 
(Köhnken, 2004; Sporer, 2016; Volbert & Steller, 2014). Scripts are 
different from common knowledge details. A script is a stereotyped 
sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation (Schank 
& Abelson, 1977, p. 41) (e.g., ‘John went to a restaurant. He ordered 
lobster. He paid the check and left’). Common knowledge details 
do not necessarily involve a sequence of events. Thus, the sentence 
‘We spent a couple of hours at the National Museum’ classifies as a 
common knowledge detail but not as a script.
Self-handicapping strategies refer to justifications as to why 
someone chooses not to provide information (“There isn’t much to 
say about the actual bungee jump as it took only a few moments”). A 
real life example occurred with Dominic Cummings, a former advisor 
to the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Cummings travelled from 
London to Durham during lockdown. This is what he said when he was 
asked whether he had discussed this trip with Johnson: “At some point 
during the first week, when we were both sick and in bed, I mentioned 
to him what I had done. Unsurprisingly, given the condition we were 
in, neither of us remember the conversation in any detail.” (https://
inews.co.uk/news/dominic-cummings-lockdown-statement-pm-
adviser-said-meant-barnard-castle-431111). For lie tellers, not having 
to provide information is an attractive strategy. However, they are 
also concerned about their credibility and believe that admitting lack 
of knowledge and/or memory appears suspicious (Ruby & Brigham, 
1998). A potential solution is to provide a justification for the inability 
to provide information. Self-handicapping strategies have never been 
examined in deception research before.
Real Time Coding
A detail is a unit of information and each new piece of information 
counts as a detail. This means that many details can occur in a 
statement, far too many to count in real time. Complications and 
common knowledge details are clusters of details. Therefore, fewer 
of them occur in a statement which makes them easier to count in 
real time. To return to the example mentioned earlier, the sentence 
“Initially we did not see our friend, as he was waiting at a different 
entrance” contains seven details but only one complication and the 
sentence “The event had an Oscars theme so everybody was dressed 
up” contains four details but only one common knowledge detail. 
Someone who just listens to those two sentences will have difficulty 
in counting the details but should be able to spot the complication 
and common knowledge detail. Self-handicapping strategies are also 
relatively easy to spot in real time as it typically contains a statement 
why some information cannot be provided followed by a justification 
for it. 
Note that the coding of complications, common knowledge 
details, and self-handicapping strategies occurs in addition 
to frequency of details coding and not instead of such coding. 
Frequency of details coding can be further specified, for example 
in contextual details. Again, this would occur in addition to the 
coding of complications, common knowledge details, and self-
handicapping strategies. For example, the sentence “We spent a 
couple of hours at the National Museum” includes two contextual 
details (a time detail – couple of hours – and a location detail – 
National Museum) but the entire sentence constitutes one common 
knowledge detail. Contextual details are typically reported more 
often by truth tellers than by lie tellers (Amado et al., 2016), but 
the way they are reported in this sentence makes it a common 
knowledge detail and such details are more likely to be reported by 
lie tellers than by truth tellers.
Decision-Making in Individual Cases
Most verbal deception research examines verbal cues to 
truthfulness, that is, verbal cues that truth tellers report more 
frequently than lie tellers. For example, all 19 CBCA criteria, 
including the variable ‘total details’, are cues to truthfulness. Only 
examining cues to truthfulness poses a problem for practitioners: 
how many details should someone report to classify as a truth 
teller or a lie teller? This question is impossible to answer. The 
number of details reported is not only dependent on veracity but 
also on the interviewee and situation. That is, some individuals 
are more talkative than other individuals and some events can be 
described in much more detail than other events (Nahari & Pazuelo, 
2015; Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Vrij, 2016). A practitioner would be in a 
much stronger position to determine that an interviewee is lying 
if s/he records not only cues that truth tellers are more likely to 
report (cues to truthfulness) but also cues that lie tellers are more 
likely to report (cues to deceit). Examining complications, common 
knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies does exactly 
that: it measures a mixture of cues to truthfulness and cues to 
deceit. Someone could be more confident that somebody is telling 
the truth if complications are present and common knowledge 
details and self-handicapping strategies are largely absent (rather 
than just complications present) and, vice versa, someone could 
be more confident that someone is lying when complications 
are largely absent and common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies occur.
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Hypotheses
Truth tellers will report more complications (Hypothesis 1) 
and fewer common knowledge details (Hypothesis 2) and self-
handicapping strategies (Hypothesis 3) than lie tellers.
Method
The procedure applied for conducting this meta-analysis 
followed the APA Meta-Analysis Reporting Standard (Cooper, 
2011) and a recently published meta-analysis on the verifiability 
approach (Palena et al., 2020).
Inclusion Criteria
We searched the literature for empirical studies examining 
complications, common knowledge details and/or self-handicapping 
strategies and used the following inclusion criteria: (1) the study 
involved one interviewee rather than pairs or groups (see for 
studying groups, Leal et al., 2018; Vernham et al., 2020); (2) the study 
measured the total frequency of complications, common knowledge 
details, and/or self-handicapping strategies; (3) the study used the 
coding procedure first outlined by Vrij et al. (2017); (4) veracity 
was manipulated (either within-subjects or between-subjects); 
(5) the study could either be based on a single interview or follow 
the within-subjects approach as outlined in Vrij, Leal, and Fisher 
(2018), where the interviewee is first asked a free recall, then s/he is 
exposed to any manipulation (e.g., the model statement), and then 
asked a second free recall; (6) statements were coded manually; and 
(7) articles were written in English. If in the selected articles ‘total 
details’ was reported, we included this variable in the analyses.
Moderator Analyses
The first moderator was the deception scenario. This is an important 
moderator for applied reasons as it examines whether effects can be 
generalised across scenarios. We distinguished between two categories: 
i) trip/memorable event, when the participants discussed a trip they had 
made or a memorable event which was out of the ordinary, and ii) spy 
mission, where the participants performed a spy mission (Moderator 
1). A second moderator was the level of motivation, because research 
has found that cues to deception are more evident in motivated rather 
than unmotivated senders (DePaulo et al., 2003). Building on DePaulo 
et al. (2003) and Suchotzki et al. (2017), we introduced two categories: 
(i) participants who received an incentive for their participation, such as 
money, university credits, a present etc., or (ii) participants who did not 
receive an incentive (Moderator 2). 
Following Palena et al. (2020), we also coded the modality of 
the interview on two levels: i) whether the participants were in-
terviewed, or ii) provided a written statement (Moderator 3). Last, 
since several interviewing techniques have been introduced in lie 
detection research (e.g., model statement, Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018, 
sketching while narrating, Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al., 2018), we also 
coded whether or not any manipulation was used in the experi-
ment (Moderator 4). Analyses showed no variability for the mod-
erators incentive (Moderator 2) and modality (Moderator 3) since 
all studies included an incentive and no study involved a written 
statement (see Appendix C). Hence, the effect of these moderators 
was not explored.
Search Strategies and Studies Selection
We conducted the literature search in October 2020, and used 
the following databases: PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, Web of Science, 
and Scopus. We looked for any type of work (article, review, book 
chapters, etc.) that included terms (“complication*” OR “common 
knowledge” OR “self-handicapping”, in title/abstract/keywords) 
and (“decept*” OR “deceit” OR “lie” OR “lying” OR “truth*”, in title/
abstract/keywords) but did not include the terms (“collect*” OR 
“pair*”, in title/abstract/keywords). We limited our research to the 
psychological, social sciences, and art and humanities areas, and to 
sources produced from 2017 onwards. We also: i) contacted scholars 
who previously published articles in which complications, common 
knowledge details, or self-handicapping strategies were reported; ii) 
visited the webpages of scholars working on these types of detail; 
iii) searched the reference list of the selected papers; iv) searched 
the 2019-2020 conference programs of the European Association of 
Psychology and Law (EAPL), and the 2017-2020 conference programs 
of the American Psychology and Law Society (AP-LS), and the 
International Investigative Interviewing Research Group (iIIRG); v) 
and conducted a search on ResearchGate. 
The selection process was conducted by two researchers with 
experience in the field. Inter-rater agreement was calculated via 
Cohen’s k and was 1.00 (100% of agreement). Appendix A shows the 
illustration of the selection process via the Prisma diagram (Moher 
et al., 2010) and Appendix B reports a description of the included 
studies and reasons for the exclusion of studies.
Coding
A coding protocol was applied to extract all the relevant 
information needed for the meta-analysis from the selected papers.
The following variables were coded: (a) truth tellers’ and lie tellers 
sample sizes; (b) mean and standard deviation of complications, 
common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies, and total 
details; (c) the deception scenario; (d) whether or not an incentive 
was provided; (e) whether the participants provided an oral or a 
written statement; and (f) whether or not any interviewing technique 
(e.g., model statement, sketching while narrating, etc.) was used. 
Regarding (b), the descriptives required to compute the effect sizes 
were obtained from three different outcome variables: i) “initial 
recall” – this refers to the first statement provided by interviewees 
who were asked to provide more than one statement, or the only 
statement provided by interviewees who provided only one recall; 
ii) “second recall” – this refers to “new” information (complications, 
common knowledge details etc) not already mentioned in the initial 
recall provided by the interviewee in a second recall; and iii) “total 
recall” – this refers to the sum of initial and second recall.
Regarding Moderator 4 (presence of manipulation), for 
“initial recall” and “second recall” data, we coded each study as 
“manipulation present” if the interviewees were exposed to any 
manipulation at any of these recall stages and as “manipulation 
absent” if they were not. For “total recall” data, we coded 
manipulation as “present” if participants were exposed to any 
manipulation at their “initial recall”, at “second recall”, or at both 
(see Appendix B for more information concerning the coding of 
Moderator 4). Inter-rater agreement for non-categorical moderators 
was analysed via percentage of agreement and was 100%. Inter-
rater agreement for categorical moderator was calculated via 
Cohen’s k and was 1.00. 
Data Analysis
Effect sizes were computed as d with Cohen’s formula when the 
study sample sizes were equal, and Hedges’ formula when the sample 
sizes were unequal. We obtained Cohen’s d from the selected studies 
wherever possible. In all other cases, we contacted the authors to 
request any missing data (data requested to authors are reported 
in Appendix B). Cohen’s d was computed so that positive values 
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indicate a higher frequency amongst truth tellers than amongst lie 
tellers. For each effect size, 95% CIs, standard error, variance, and 
the level of significance were computed. However, Cohen’s d is not 
always straightforward to interpret. For this reason, we also reported 
two additional statistics for the estimation of the magnitude of the 
effect: the probability of superiority of the effect size (PSES) and the 
probability of inferiority score (PIS) (Arias et al., 2020; Monteiro et al., 
2018). The former is a transformation of the observed effect size as a 
percentile. For example, if a positive effect size represents a higher 
frequency of details amongst truth tellers than lie tellers, a PSES = 
.30 indicates that the observed effect size is greater than 30% of all 
possible effect sizes. PIS is the probability that truth tellers obtain a 
score that is lower than the mean score of lie tellers. For example, if 
PIS = .30, 30% of truth tellers would report an amount of detail lower 
than the mean score of lie tellers.
The effect sizes obtained from the selected sources were analysed 
via standard meta-analytic procedures (Borenstein et al., 2011) via the 
meta-analytic software ProMeta3. All effect sizes were pooled via the 
inverse-variance method. All outcomes concerning the initial recall, 
and total detail and complications for second and total recall were 
pooled via a random-effects model as it allows to account both for 
within-studies and between-studies variances. In contrast, common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies for second recall 
and total recall were pooled using the fixed-effect method.
Heterogeneity was explored using the Q statistic (indicating a lack 
of homogeneity if significant), and the I2 statistic, which estimates 
what proportion of the observed variance is related to real differences 
in the analysed effect sizes. An I2 of 70% or more is deemed as a high 
difference, 50% as moderate, and 25% as low (Borenstein et al., 2011; 
Cooper, 2015). Moreover, we explored the standardised residuals of 
each study to detect possible outliers and sensitivity analyses (where 
one study at a time is removed) were conducted to explore the (in)
stability of the results.
Publication bias was explored via the trim and fill method.
We also carried out meta-analyses via the Bayesian model 
averaging method (Gronau et al., 2017, 2020). See Appendix J.
Results
Included Studied Description
One-hundred and twenty-one records were found through the 
database search, and three records through other sources. After 
removing the duplicates, 105 records were screened in their titles 
and abstracts. Eighty-three records did not relate to verbal credibility 
assessment and were thus excluded. One was excluded because, 
although focusing on verbal credibility assessment, it did not analyse 
complications, common knowledge details, or self-handicapping 
strategies (Leal et al., 2018), and one was excluded because it focused 
on pairs of interviewees (Vernham et al., 2020). The remaining 20 
records were read in full to evaluate if they matched the eligibility 
criteria. Three of them were excluded because they did not contain 
new data (Vrij & Leal, 2020; Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al., 2019; Vrij & Vrij, 
2020); one was excluded because it was theoretical rather than 
empirical (Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018); one was excluded because 
the only cue that they examined – complications – did not occur 
frequently enough to be analysed leaving us with no data to report 
(Verigin, Meijer, Vrij et al., 2020); and one was excluded because we 
did not manage to obtain the required data from the authors (Verigin, 
Meijer, & Vrij, 2020).
In the end, 14 studies were included in the meta-analysis, and all of 
them employed a between-subjects design for veracity (participants 
were either asked to tell the truth or to lie). Three articles included two 
independent subgroups, where one was exposed to a manipulation 
(e.g., the model statement) and the other was not (Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et 
al., 2018; Vrij et al., 2017; Vrij, Mann et al., 2020). Two studies included 
three recalls and four subgroups, where one subgroup was exposed 
to a manipulation only the first time they recalled the event, one was 
exposed to a manipulation only the second time they recalled the 
event (with a one-week delay), one was exposed to a manipulation 
at both times, and one at neither (see Appendix B, for an explanation 
concerning how we treated these groups in the analyses) (Deeb et 
al., 2020; Deeb et al., 2021). One article included two studies with 
independent samples (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020), of which the second 
study included three subgroups. Also, Leal et al. (2019) and Vrij, Leal, 
Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. (2019) included three subgroups. In Vrij, Leal, 
Deeb, et al. (2020), Leal et al. (2019), and Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, 
et al. (2019) the three subgroups differed in their exposure (or not) 
to a specific manipulation technique. All subgroups of these studies 
were therefore independent. Appendix B reports the characteristics 
of all studies and specific notes for each of them, including how the 
independent subgroups were treated for the analyses. Complications 
were measured in every study, but the other variables were not (see 
Appendix C).
In the end, we analysed the 14 articles that fit eligibility criteria. 
Appendix C reports main characteristics of included studies, which 
are marked in the reference list with an asterisk.
Overall Effect Sizes Estimation
Initial recall. A random-effects meta-analysis of the 17 samples 
related to the “frequency of total details” (N = 2,083) showed that 
truth tellers reported more total details than lie tellers, with a 
moderate effect size (Cohen, 1988), d = 0.45, 95% CI [0.32, 0.59], 
p < .001, PSES = .251, PIS = .326 (see forest plot in Appendix D). The 
meta-analysis also showed moderate heterogeneity, Q(16) = 36.07, 
p < .01, I2 = 55.65. When exploring the residuals of each study and 
their significance, one study appeared to be an outlier (Vrij, Mann, 
et al., 2020). A sensitivity analysis showed that the effect size ranged 
from d = 0.41, 95% CI [0.29, 0.53], p < .001, when the outlier study was 
excluded, to d = 0.48, 95% CI [0.35, 0.61], p < .001. Moderator’s effects 
for manipulation (k = 13 for “manipulation absent”, d = 0.44 and k = 
4 for “manipulation present”, d = 0.53) and scenario (k = 13 for “past 
trip event”, d = 0.40 and k = 4 for “spy mission”, d = 0.63) were not 
significant (Table 1), indicating that neither of the two moderators 
had a significant effect on the frequency of total details provided by 
truth tellers vs. lie tellers. The funnel plot showed to be asymmetric 
to some degree (Appendix E), and the trim and fill method trimmed 
two studies. Yet, both observed (d = 0.45) and estimated (d = 0.40, 
PSES = .221 and PIS = .345) effect sizes were in the moderate effect 
size region.
Table 1. Initial Recall for Total details - Moderator Analysis
Variable QB(df) k d 95% CI QW(df)
Manipulation 0.47(1)
No 13 0.44*** [0.27, 0.60] 34.78(12)
**
Yes  4 0.53*** [0.33, 0.72] 0.15(3)
Scenario 1.12(1)
Past trip event 13 0.40*** [0.28, 0.51] 17.95(12)
Spy mission  4 0.63** [0.21, 1.05] 12.55(3)
**
Note. A positive d indicates that truth tellers reported more details than lie tellers; CI 
= confidence interval; QB = heterogeneity between factors levels; QW = heterogeneity 
within factors levels. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
A random-effects meta-analysis of the 18 samples for “frequency 
of complications” (N = 2,163) showed that truth tellers reported more 
complications than lie tellers, with a moderate effect size of d = 0.58, 
95% CI [0.48, 0.68], p < .001, PSES = .318, PIS = .281 (Appendix D). This 
supports Hypothesis 1. Q statistic was not significant, Q(17) = 21.32, 
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p = .21, and I2 = 20.25 showed low heterogeneity. Due to the lack of 
heterogeneity there is no need to conduct moderator analyses neither 
for manipulation (k = 14 absent, k = 4 present) nor for scenario (k = 
14 past trip event, k = 4 spy mission). Sensitivity analyses showed 
that effect sizes ranged from d = 0.56, 95% CI [0.47, 0.66], p < .001, 
to d = 0.62, 95% CI [0.53, 0.71], p < .001, when the only outlier study 
(Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Deeb, et al., 2019) was excluded. The funnel 
plot was asymmetric (Appendix E) and three studies were trimmed. 
Yet, observed (d = 0.58) and estimated (d = 0.54) effect sizes were 
comparable. 
A random-effects meta-analysis on the 12 samples for “frequency 
of common knowledge details” (N = 1,498) showed that truth tellers 
reported fewer common knowledge details than lie tellers, with a 
moderate effect size of d = -0.40, 95% CI [-0.52, -0.27], p < .001, PSES 
= .221, PIS = .655 (Appendix D). This supports Hypothesis 2. There 
was low heterogeneity between studies, I2 = 26.91, Q(11) = 15.05, p 
= .18. Due to the lack of heterogeneity, there is no need to conduct 
moderator analyses neither for manipulation (k = 8 absent, k = 4 
present) nor for scenario (all studies belonged to the past trip event 
category). Sensitivity analyses showed that the effect ranged from 
d = -0.37, 95% CI [-0.49, -0.25], p < .001 to d = -0.44, 95% CI [-0.55, 
-0.33], p < .001, when the only outlier study was excluded (Vrij, Leal, 
Fisher, Mann, Deeb, et al., 2019). The funnel plot did not show a clear 
asymmetry, and two studies were trimmed (Appendix E). Again, 
observed (d = -0.40) and estimated (d = -0.36) effect sizes were 
comparable.
Finally, a random effects meta-analysis on the 13 samples for the 
“frequency of self-handicapping strategy” (N = 1,620) showed that 
truth tellers reported fewer self-handicapping strategies than lie 
tellers with a small effect size of d = -0.37, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.20], p < 
.001 (Appendix D). This supports Hypothesis 3. There was moderate 
heterogeneity between studies, I2 = 63.63, Q(12) = 32.99, p < .01. 
Moderator effects for manipulation (“manipulation absent” k = 9, 
“manipulation present” k = 4, Qbetween(1) = 0.49, p = .48) and scenario 
(past trip event k = 12, spy mission k = 1, Qbetween(1) = 0.68, p = .41) were 
not significant. Sensitivity analyses showed that the effect size ranged 
from d = -0.31, 95% CI [-0.44, -0.17], p < .001, when the only outlier 
record was excluded (Vrij et al., 2017, subgroup 2, manipulation 
present), to d = -0.41, 95% CI [-0.57, -0.24], p < .001. The funnel plot did 
not show a clear asymmetry and no study was trimmed (Appendix E).
Second recall. A random-effects meta-analysis on the 17 samples 
focusing on “new total detail” (N = 1,658) showed that truth tellers 
reported more new details than lie tellers with a small effect size of 
d = 0.28, 95% CI [0.17, 0.39], p < .001 (Appendix F). There was low 
heterogeneity, I2 = 27.22, Q(16) = 21.98, p = .14. Hence, this means that 
there is no need to conduct any moderator analysis for manipulation 
(k = 6 absent, k = 11 present) nor for scenario (k = 13 past trip event, k 
= 4 spy mission). Further, sensitivity analyses showed that the effect 
size ranged from d = 0.25, 95% CI [0.16, 0.35], p < .001, when the 
only outlier study was excluded (Vrij, Mann, et al., 2020, subgroup 
2, manipulation present), to d = 0.30, 95% CI [0.19, 0.41], p < .001. 
The funnel plot appeared symmetric and no study was trimmed 
(Appendix G). 
A random-effects meta-analysis on the 17 samples focusing on 
“new complications” (N = 1,658) indicated that truth tellers reported 
more new complications than lie tellers with a moderate effect size, 
d = 0.51, 95% CI [0.42, 0.61], p < .001, PSES = .281, PIS = .305 (Appendix 
F). This supports Hypothesis 1. There was no heterogeneity, I2 = 0.00, 
Q(16) = 13.01, p = .67; hence, no moderator analysis was conducted 
for manipulation (k = 6 absent, k = 11 present) nor for scenario (k = 13 
past trip event, k = 4 spy mission). There were no outlier studies and 
the effect size ranged from d = 0.50, 95% CI [0.40, 0.60], p < .001 to d 
= 0.53, 95% CI [0.43, 0.63], p < .001. The trim and fill method trimmed 
no study and the funnel plot appeared symmetrical (Appendix G). 
A fixed effect meta-analysis on the 10 samples focusing on “new 
common knowledge details” (N = 1,149) showed that truth tellers 
report fewer new common knowledge details than lie tellers with a 
moderate effect size, d = -0.46, 95% CI [-0.58, -0.35], p < .001, PSES = 
.259, PIS = .677 (Appendix F). This supports Hypothesis 2. There was 
no heterogeneity, I2 = 0.00, Q(9) = 5.85, p = .75; hence no moderator 
analysis was conducted for manipulation (k = 4 absent, k = 6 present) 
nor for scenario (all studies belonged to the past event trip category). 
No study was an outlier and a sensitivity analysis showed that the 
effect size ranged from d = -0.45, 95% CI [-0.57, -0.32], p < .001, to d = 
-0.50, 95% CI [-0.62, -0.38], p < .001. One study was trimmed via the 
trim and fill method (Appendix G), and the observed (d = -0.46) and 
the estimated (d = -0.45) were almost identical.
A fixed-effect meta-analysis on the 10 samples focusing on “new 
self-handicapping strategies” (N = 1,067) showed that truth tellers 
report fewer new self-handicapping strategies than lie tellers with a 
moderate effect size, d = -0.50, 95% CI [-0.56, -0.44], p < .001, PSES = 
.274, PIS = .691 (Appendix F). This supports Hypothesis 3. There was 
moderate heterogeneity, I2 = 55.66, Q(9) = 20.30, p < .05. There was a 
significant effect for manipulation, Qbetween(1) = 7.41, p < .01. Studies in 
the “manipulation absent” category (k = 4) obtained a smaller effect 
size (d = -.23, 95% CI [-.43, -.04], p < .05, Qwithin(3) = 1.58, pQwithin = .66) 
than those in the “manipulation present” category (k = 6, d = -.52, 
95% CI [-.59, -.46], p < .001, Qwithin(5) = 11.31, p = .05). The effect of the 
moderator “scenario” was not significant (past trip event k = 8, spy 
mission k = 2, Qbetween(1) = 1.81, pQwihin = .18). There was one outlier study 
(Vrij, Leal, Jupe, et al., 2018). Sensitivity analyses showed that the 
effect ranged from d = -0.27, 95% CI [-0.39, -0.15], p < .001, when such 
study was excluded, to d = -0.51, 95% CI [-0.57, -0.45], p < .001. The trim 
and fill method showed that no study was trimmed (Appendix G).
Total recall. A series of meta-analyses for “total recall” showed a 
pattern that was similar to that of second recall (see Appendices H 
and I). Truth tellers reported more unique total details and unique 
complications but fewer unique common knowledge details and 
unique self-handicapping strategies than lie tellers. Heterogeneity 
analyses were not significant (Table 2).
Discussion
The meta-analysis showed support for all three hypotheses and 
revealed that truth tellers reported more complications and fewer 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies than lie 
tellers. Findings were very similar for first initial recall, the ond recall 
(where only new information after first recall was examined), and for 
total recall (initial and second recalls combined). The finding that the 
Table 2. Meta-analysis for Total Recall Data
Sensitivity analysis Trim and fill
Variable k N d [95% CI] Q(df) I
2 Min d [95% CI] Max d [95% CI] Trimmed studies
Estimated  
effect size
Total details1 15 1,454 0.45 [0.35, 0.55] 13.93(14)   0.00 0.42 [0.32, 0.53] 0.47 [0.36, 0.58] 5 d = 0.37
Complications1 15 1,454 0.62 [0.49, 0.75] 21.10(14) 33.64 0.59 [0.46, 0.71] 0.65 [0.51, 0.78] 4 d = 0.53
Common knowledge details2   8   945  -0.43 [-0.56, -0.30] 5.56(7)   0.00 -0.39 [-0.53, -0.25] -0.47 [-0.61, -0.33] 0 d = -0.43
Self-handicapping strategies2 10 1,067 -0.37 [-0.49, -0.25] 7.21(9)   0.00 -0.35 [-0.47, -0.22] -0.40 [-0.52, -0.27] 0 d = -0.37
Note. 1random-effects model; 2fixed effect model.
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pattern of results obtained in a first recall tends to repeat itself in a 
second recall should increase confidence amongst practitioners when 
they use these variables in a two recall interview when attempting to 
detect deceit. It may also indicate robustness of the findings.
All effect sizes were moderate but they were somewhat larger 
for complications (d ranged from 0.51 to 0.62) than for common 
knowledge details (d ranged from -0.40 to -0.46) and self-
handicapping strategies (d ranged from -0.37 to -.50). Further, the 
PIS indicated that a greater proportion of truth tellers would obtain 
the expected scores when focusing on complications (higher scores 
than lie tellers) than when focusing on common knowledge or self-
handicapping strategies (lower scores than lie tellers). The relatively 
weaker results for common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies (both cues to deceit) than for complications (cue to 
truthfulness) is unfortunate. The verbal deception field is in much 
stronger need of cues to deceit than cues to truthfulness because so 
few verbal cues to deceit do exist (Nahari et al., 2019).
Although complications can be coded in probably most statements, 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies do not 
always occur (Vrij, Granhag, et al., 2021). They are typically examined 
in a ‘travel’ scenario where participants report a trip they allegedly 
have made in the last twelve months. Making a trip is arguably a 
somewhat scripted activity, which makes common knowledge details 
more likely to occur (“We visited the famous market, after which we 
went to the beach. We had dinner in a Mexican restaurant”). And when 
the trip was not recent, it gives lie tellers a good opportunity to include 
self-handicapping strategies (“I cannot remember which restaurants 
we went to in the evenings, because we went there three months 
ago”). The situation is different when someone describes a unique 
event that just happened. It seems reasonable to suggest that lie tellers 
are more likely to report common knowledge details when describing 
a somewhat scripted event than a unique event and that they are 
more likely to report self-handicapping strategies when describing an 
event that occurred in the past as opposed to an event that occurred 
recently.
Truth tellers may also include common knowledge details in their 
statements and perhaps particularly so when they do not see the 
relevance of describing the experience in more detail. These common 
knowledge details will be impossible to distinguish from those 
reported by lie tellers. A possible solution is to stress to interviewees 
that they should report every detail they can remember even the 
insignificant ones. An alternative solution is to expose interviewees 
to a model statement, an example of a detailed account (Leal et al., 
2015), so that interviewees are made aware of the amount of detail 
they are expected to provide. A model statement has shown to be an 
effective method to generate information (Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018).
Truth tellers may also admit lack of memory when an event 
happened some time ago and, as a result, may include self-
handicapping strategies in their statement (“I cannot remember which 
restaurants we went to in the evenings, because we went there three 
months ago”). Admitting lack of memory is a CBCA criterion and truth 
tellers report those more frequently than lie tellers (Amado et al., 2016). 
There are two differences between self-handicapping strategies and 
admitting lack of memory. First, admitting lack of memory becomes a 
self-handicapping strategy only when it is followed by a justification: 
In the sentence above: “… because we were there three months ago.” 
Thus, the sentence “I cannot remember which restaurants we went to 
in the evenings” would classify as admitting lack of memory in CBCA 
but does not constitute a self-handicapping strategy. Second, self-
handicapping strategies do not just include admitting lack of memory; 
it also includes admitting lack of perceptual experiences. The example 
“There isn’t much to say about the actual bungee jump as it took only 
a few moments” constitutes a self-handicapping strategy of the lack of 
perceptual experiences type. Perhaps a distinction between these two 
types of self-handicapping strategies, an admitting lack of memory 
type and an admitting lack of experiences type, may make the 
difference between truth tellers and lie tellers more pronounced. That 
is, perhaps truth tellers are more likely to include in their statements 
the memory-type of self-handicapping strategies than the experience-
type. This suggests that the experience-type will be the strongest 
veracity indicator.
Complications was not only a stronger veracity indicator than 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies, it was also a 
more diagnostic veracity indicator than total details. This was particularly 
the case in the second recall (d = 0.51 for complications and d = 0.28 
for total details). The relatively low d score for total details in a second 
recall suggests that the finding obtained for complications (pattern of 
results obtained in a first recall repeats itself in a second recall) does not 
apply to total details to the same extent. This makes total details a more 
problematic cue to use for lie detection purposes than complications.
A possible benefit of total details is that the cue always can be 
examined, because even brief statements (perhaps with the exception 
of ‘no comment’) always include details. Very short statements may 
not include complications. Whether total details emerges as a strong 
veracity cue in short statements is an empirical question. This may not 
be the case, because verbal cues to deception are more likely to occur 
in longer statements because words are the carriers of verbal cues 
to veracity (Vrij et al. 2007). It is also an empirical question whether 
complications emerge as a stronger veracity indicator than total 
details in deception scenarios other than the ones examined in this 
meta-analysis. All we can conclude at this stage is that complications 
emerged as a stronger veracity indicator than total details in the 
scenarios examined in this meta-analysis.
The moderators did affect only the results for new self-handicapping 
strategies in the second recall. It means that effect sizes were mostly 
homogeneous across studies. Yet, this should be taken with some 
caution because of the (i) low number of studies and (ii) unbalanced 
groups (Borenstein et al, 2011). The absence of a moderator effect 
cannot be interpreted as evidence that interview techniques have no 
effect on the dependent variables (Moderator 4), because moderator 
analyses often have low power (Borenstein et al., 2011). To examine 
whether an interview technique has an effect on dependent variables 
someone should either analyse more studies or compare “within each 
experiment” an experimental (‘technique present’) condition with a 
control (‘technique absent’) condition. The latter is different from what 
happened in moderator analyses in the present meta-analysis. Here, 
across all samples included in the meta-analysis, ‘technique absent’ 
conditions were compared with ‘technique present’ conditions, but 
these absent and present conditions did not always belong to the 
same experiment.
We note four limitations. First, all the available research comes 
from Vrij’s lab. This is not uncommon in deception research. For 
example, in a meta-analysis of Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) 
research, Granhag was an author on every publication (Hartwig et 
al., 2014). It is even not uncommon in interviewing research. For 
example, also in a meta-analysis of the Scharff technique, Granhag 
was an author on every publication (Luke, 2021). Despite this, 
research carried out by other researchers seems essential. At present 
we cannot rule out that the way Vrij and colleagues operationalise 
and code the three variables is idiosyncratic and that this is driving 
the effects. The general lack of heterogeneity in the effects presented 
in this meta-analysis is unusual for deception research (DePaulo et 
al., 2003) and psychology research in general (Stanley et al., 2018). 
This could be due to small sample sizes (Borenstein et al., 2011, 2016). 
Another factor could be a lack of variance in deception scenarios 
in which cues have been examined. A wider spread of deception 
scenarios is thus welcome and the contribution of other researchers 
to this domain would facilitate this.
A second limitation is that all studies are lab-based studies but field 
studies testing hypotheses seem relevant. This could be a challenge due 
to the difficulty in obtaining ground truth in field studies. Third, the 
number of studies on which this meta-analysis was based was limited. 
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Although this is not uncommon in this field (Hartwig et al., 2014; 
Luke, 2021) more research is required, particularly regarding common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies for second and 
total recalls as the number of included studies is insufficient.
Fourth, we stated that examining complications, common 
knowledge details, and self-handicapping details is advantageous 
compared to coding total details because the former three variables 
can be coded in real time whereas the latter variable cannot. Note that 
there is yet no empirical evidence that the former three variables can 
be coded in real time.
Several issues merit further research, such as in which types 
of setting complications, common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies (1) can be examined and (2) yield the 
strongest effects. We already know that common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies cannot be examined in certain 
situations and the search for alternative cues to deceit that occur 
in such settings seems urgent (Nahari et al., 2019). Another area of 
research is whether the three variables become more diagnostic 
if they are considered in relation to the type of detail they refer to. 
For example, truth tellers compared to lie tellers tend to include (1) 
more verifiable details in their statements (Palena et al., 2020) and (2) 
focus more on core aspects of an event (Sakrisvold et al., 2017). Are 
therefore complications reported in verifiable details and core events 
more diagnostic than complications reported in unverifiable details 
and peripheral events? In addition, as we already suggested above, it 
is worthwhile to compare how diagnostic these three variables are as 
veracity indicators compared to the total details variable.
Researchers should examine whether complications, common 
knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies indeed can be 
counted in real time. In our training of practitioners, we focus on 
complications and self-handicapping strategies and our experience 
is that they can be counted in real time. However, we have never 
formally examined this. In addition, we have never examined 
whether practitioners can also count common knowledge details in 
real time. Finally, it seems likely that new verbal veracity indicators 
other than complications, common knowledge details, and self-
handicapping strategies do exist. The field is in particular need of 
cues that lie tellers report more frequently than truth tellers (cues 
to deceit). In that respect, although it does not constitute a new cue 
to deceit, separating self-handicapping strategies into two types, 
one that does include admitting lack of memory and another type 
that includes admitting lack of perceptual experiences, may be a 
first step. We hope this meta-analysis stimulates researchers to 
address these and other issues.
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Appendix B
Article Notes and Reasons for Excluded Sources (continued)
Study Notes Data requested to authors
Deeb et al. (2020) In this study participants were interviewed three times, each one week apart. T1 
is the immediate interview, T2 is the second interview (after one week) and T3 is 
the final interview (after another week). Participants could be exposed to a Model 
Statement at T1, T2, T1 and T2 or not at all. We considered T1 as “Initial recall” 
and T2 as “Second recall”. “Total recall” are the total of unique complications etc. 
reported during the entire interview (all repetitions disregarded).
For T1 (“Initial recall”) we report an effect size for the two subgroups that received 
the Model Statement at T1 (“Manipulation present”) and an effect size for the two 
subgroups who did not receive the Model Statement at T1 (“Manipulation absent”). 
For T2 (“Second recall”) we report an effect size for participants that received the 
Model Statement at T2 (“Manipulation present”) and an effect size for those that 
did not receive the MS at T2 (“Manipulation absent”).
For T2 “Total recall”, we report an effect size for participants that received the 
Model Statement at T1, T2 or both at T1 and T2 (“Manipulation present”) and an 
effect size for those who did not receive the Model Statement at either T1 nor T2 
(“Manipulation absent”).
Initial Recall (T1 data)
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables for:
Subgroups 1 (MS at T1) and 3 (MS at T1 and T2) combined
Subgroups 2 (MS at T2) and 4 (control, no MS) combined
Second Recall (T2 data)
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables (new 
details) for:
Subgroups 2 (MS at T2) and 3 (MS at T1 and T2) combined
Subgroup 1 (MS at T1) and 4 (control, no MS)
Total Recall (T1 + T2 data)
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables (unique 
details) for:
Subgroups 1 (MS at T1) 2 (MS at T2) and 3 (MS at T1 and T2) 
combined.
Subgroup 4 (control, no MS)
Deeb et al. (2021) This study used the same protocol as Deeb et al. (2020) except that the 
manipulation involved the Sketching technique rather than the Model Statement 
technique. Hence, we reported the effect sizes in the same way as we did for Deeb 
et al. (2020).
Initial Recall (T1 data)
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables for:
Subgroups 1 (Sketching at T1) and 3 (Sketching at T1 and T2) 
combined.
Subgroups 2 (Sketching at T2) and 4 (control, no Sketching) 
combined.
Second Recall (T2 data)
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables (new 
details) for:
Subgroups 2 (Sketching at T2) and 3 (Sketching at T1 and T2) 
combined.
Subgroups 1 (Sketching at T1) and 4 (control, no Sketching) 
combined.
Total Recall (T1 + T2 data)
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables (unique 
details) for:
Subgroups 1 (Sketching at T1) 2 (Sketching at T2) and 3 
(Sketching at T1 and T2) combined.
Subgroup 4 (control, no Sketching)
Leal et al. (2020) Participants were interviewed twice. In Interview 2 they recalled what they 
had discussed in Interview 1 (hence Interview 1 was the stimulus material). In 
Interview 2 they firstly answered a free recall question (“Initial recall”) followed 
by a Model Statement followed by a second free recall question (“Second recall”). 
Answers to the two phases of Interview 2 were used in the present study. For Initial 
recall, we coded Manipulation as “absent”. For Second and Total recalls we coded 
Manipulation as “present”. The authors did not report common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies as these details did not occur frequently enough.
Total Recall
Confidence intervals for Cohen’s d for both unique total detail 
and unique complications.
Leal et al. (2019) The participants provided one statement, hence, for this experiment only the data 
for “Initial recall” are used. Manipulation was coded as “present” for the “ghost 
writer” group and as “absent” for the other two groups (no instruction and ‘be 
detailed’ instruction) combined.
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for control condition and 
be detailed condition combined.
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables for 
control and be detailed conditions combined.
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for “ghost writer” 
condition.
Verigin, Meijer, & Vrij 
(2020)
Excluded. It was not possible to obtain the necessary information from the authors Effect sizes and confidence intervals accounting for the 
entire statement for truth tellers and for the two lie tellers 
conditions combined.
Verigin, Meijer, Vrij, et 
al. (2020)
Excluded: The author coded complications but did not report them as they did not 
occur frequently enough.
Vrij and Leal (2020) Excluded: This paper does not contain new data. It aggregates the data from Vrij et 
al. (2017) and from Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2018).
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 
(2020, Study 1)
Participants (real airport travellers) were interviewed about their trip by an 
immigration officer. They provided only one statement. Hence, for this experiment 
only the data for “Initial recall” are used. Complications was the only variable 
examined. No manipulation took place, hence for this study we coded Manipulation 
as “absent”.
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Study Notes Data requested to authors
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 
(2020, Study 2)
Phase 1 of Study 2 was largely identical to Study 1. Study 2 also included a 
Phase 2, where participants were interviewed by a second interviewer after the 
manipulation (e.g., Model Statement) took place. The authors did not examine 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. For the Initial recall 
we report an effect size for the whole sample (101 truth tellers and 107 lie tellers) 
because there was no manipulation at Phase 1. Hence, for Initial recall Manipulation 
was coded as “absent”. For Second and Total recalls, the interviewee could be 
exposed to no Manipulation (coded as “Manipulation absent”), a Model Statement 
(coded as “Manipulation present”), or a Model Statement plus an Information 
Protocol (coded as “Manipulation present”).
Second Recall
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for new total detail for 
each subgroup.
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for control condition
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for IP condition
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for IP + MS condition
Total Recall
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for unique total detail for 
each subgroup.
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for unique complications 
for each subgroup.
Vrij, Leal, and Fisher 
(2018)
Excluded: The paper is theoretical rather than empirical
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. 
(2018)1
This paper focuses on the sixth question asked of the interview protocol; the first 
five questions are reported in Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al. (2018) (see below). Half of 
the participants were asked to sketch while answering this question, whereas the 
other half were not asked to sketch. We coded this data as Second recall for the 
two subgroups (Manipulation present vs. Manipulation absent) independently. The 
authors did not examine self-handicapping strategies.
Second Recall
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for control condition
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for the Sketching 
condition.
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables for the 
control condition.
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables for the 
Sketching condition
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, 
Debb, et al. (2019)
In this study coaching was manipulated. Participants were either coached or not 
about the Model Statement and the Type of Details the interview would focus 
on. The whole sample was included in this meta-analysis (both the coached 
group and the control group) but the effect of coaching was not considered. First, 
when considering the whole interview (before and after the Model Statement 
was employed), there was no significant difference between the two coaching 
conditions on the various dependent variables. Second, there is no other study 
on the effect of coaching on the model statement and the type of details (e.g., 
complications). Hence, it would not be possible to examine the moderating role of 
this type of coaching. The Model Statement was applied before the Second recall. 
Hence, we coded Initial recall as “Manipulation absent” and Second and Total recalls 
as “Manipulation present”.
Initial Recall
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables 
considering the whole sample.
Second Recall
Effect size and confidence interval for new low and medium/
high complication combined considering the whole sample.
Total Recall
Effect size and confidence interval for unique low and 
medium/high complication combined considering the whole 
sample.
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, 
Jo, et al. (2019)
In this study the participants were given the opportunity to discuss up to four 
events. To maintain the independency of the data, we only focused on the first 
event they discussed. Initial recall (phase 1 of the experiment) was provided before 
the sketching manipulation took place and focused on the entire event. As for Vrij, 
Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, Study 2), we report an effect size for the whole sample. 
Second recall focused on a particularly memorable event of the entire story. For 
Second and Total recalls, participants could be exposed to no manipulation (coded 
as “Manipulation absent”), to a standard Sketching manipulation or to a Model 
Sketching manipulation. We combined the two Sketching condition (there was no 
difference between the two) and coded them as “Manipulation present”. 
Second Recall
n for truth tellers, n for lie tellers, effect sizes and confidence 
intervals for all variables for control condition.
n for truth tellers, n for lie tellers, effect sizes and confidence 
intervals for all variables for the two Sketching condition 
(Standard Sketching and Model Sketching) combined.
Total Recall
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables for 
control condition.
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables for the 
two Sketching condition (Standard Sketching and Model 
Sketching) combined.
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, et al. 
(2018)
Participants were interviewed about a trip they had made in the last 12 months. 
They reported the same event twice: Once before and once after the Model 
Statement. The first time the participants recalled the event is Initial recall (coded 
as “Manipulation absent”). The second time the participants recalled the event, 
after being exposed to the Model Statement, is Second recall. Hence, Second and 
Total recalls were coded as “Manipulation present”.
Effect size and confidence intervals for Total Recall
Vrij et al. (2017)2
Participants of different ethnicities were interviewed about a trip they had made, 
either in their first language or through an interpreter. Since the interpreter 
manipulation was not significant, we considered the two interpreter conditions 
as a whole (interpreter present and interpreter absent combined). The authors 
also manipulated the presence vs. absence of a Model Statement, so that one 
subgroup was exposed whereas the other was not exposed to such a technique. 
We considered the two Model Statements subgroups independently. The group 
that was not exposed to the Model Statement was coded as “Manipulation absent”, 
whereas the group that was exposed to the Model Statement was coded as 
“Manipulation present”
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for control condition
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for MS condition
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for total detail and self-
Handicapping for:
Subgroups 1 (control)
Subgroup 2 (MS condition)
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Study Notes Data requested to authors
Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al. 
(2018)1
In this paper, interviewees initially answered five questions about the planning 
and the execution of a trip they allegedly made. They then they answered a sixth 
(final) question focusing on the best thing that happened to them during the trip. 
The article only reported the results for the initial five questions and the answer to 
that sixth question was reported in Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2018). Here, we focused 
on the whole sample and coded Manipulation as “absent”, as the sketching was 
introduced only after the fifth question. 
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables 
considering the whole sample (unexpected and expected 
questions combined).
Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al. 
(2019)2
Excluded: This paper does not contain new data as it is based on the dataset in Vrij 
et al. (2017).
Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al. 
(2020)3
The British participants of this study were taken from the dataset used in Vrij, 
Mann, et al. (2020), whereas the Arab participants were new participants. Thus, 
for this study we only report data from the Arab participants. The authors did not 
examine common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. No interview 
technique was introduced so we coded Manipulation as “absent”. 
Vrij, Mann, et al. (2021) In this study, the authors did not examine common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies. Further, this experiment explored the effect of applying 
multiple techniques in one interview. Hence, it was based on several recalls, one 
after each specific technique was introduced. Consequently, the effect size for 
Total recall is based on several recalls and several manipulation tactics. We coded 
Initial recall as “Manipulation absent” as no technique was introduced at this time. 
Interviewees were exposed to a Model Statement before Second recall. Hence, we 
coded Second recall as “Manipulation present”. Interviewees were then exposed to 
three other techniques (reverse order, sketching, indication to provide checkable 
sources). Hence, we coded Total recall (that was the last interview that took place, 
after all techniques were employed) as “Manipulation present”. 
Vrij, Mann, et al. 
(2020)3
In this experiment the participants completed a mock mission which included 
receiving a package from an agent. The Initial recall focused on the whole mission, 
whereas the Second recall focused only on the time of the package exchange. There 
was no manipulation at phase 1. Hence, as we did for Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, 
Study 2) and Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. (2019) for Initial recall, we report 
an effect size for the whole sample. After Initial recall, participants were either 
exposed (coded as “Manipulation present”) or not (coded as “Manipulation absent”) 
to the Sketching manipulation. Hence, for Second and Total recalls, we obtained an 
effect size for the Sketching-present condition and an effect size for the Sketching-
absent condition. Further, the authors did not examine common knowledge details. 
Last, the author coded the details for different themes of the statements separately 
(e.g., information about the route of the trip and information about the location). 
We report effect size for all themes combined.
Initial Recall
Effect size and confidence intervals for details and 
complications, considering the whole sample.
Effect size and confidence interval for self-handicapping for 
the whole sample.
Second Recall
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables (new 
total detail, new complications, new self-handicapping 
strategies) for each subgroup (control, Sketching) for all 
themes concerning the time of the exchange combined
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for control condition.
n for truth tellers and n for lie tellers for Sketching condition
Total Recall
Effect sizes and confidence intervals for all variables (unique 
total detail, unique complications, unique self-handicapping 
strategies) for each subgroup (control, Sketching) for all 
themes concerning the time of the exchange combined.
Vrij and Vrij (2020) Excluded: This paper does not contain new data. It aggregates the data from Vrij, 
Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. (2019), Vrij et al. (2017), and Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. 
(2018).
Note. Superscripts indicate that the papers were based on the same dataset (1, 2), or on a partial overlap of the datasets (3).
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Appendix C1
Study Characteristics – Initial Recall












Deeb et al. (2020, subgroups 1 
and 3 - MS at T1 and MS at T1 
and T2)
59 62 121 0.57 [0.21, 0.93] 0.53 [0.17, 0.89] -0.18 [-0.53, 0.17] -0.15 [-0.50, 0.21] Past trip event MS (P) yes Oral
Deeb et al. (2020, subgroups 2 
and 4 –MS at T2 and control) 61 61 122 0.48 [0.12, 0.83] 0.46 [0.10, 0.81] -0.40 [-0.75, -0.04] -0.30 [-0.65, 0.06]
Past trip 
event None (A) yes Oral
Deeb et al. (2021, subgroups 
1 and 3 - Sketching at T1 and 
Sketching at T1 and T2)
60 60 120 0.50 [0.14, 0.85] 0.69 [0.32, 1.05] -0.53 [-0.89, -0.17] -0.26 [-0.61, 0.10] Past trip event Sketching (P) yes Oral
Deeb et al. (2021, subgroups 
2 and 4 - Sketching at T2 and 
control)
62 61 123 0.39 [0.04, 0.74] 0.63 [0.27, 0.98] -0.51 [-0.86, -0.15] -0.19 [-0.54, 0.16] Past trip event None (A) yes Oral
Leal et al. (2020) 44 41 85 0.04 [-0.38, 0.46] 0.34 [-0.08, 0.77] did not occur frequently enough
did not occur 
frequently enough Spy mission None (A) yes Oral
Leal et al. (2019, subgroup 1 and 
2 combined – no manipulation 
and “Be detailed”)
48 51 99 0.56 [0.16, 0.95] 0.87 [0.47, 1.28] -0.67 [-1.34, -0.01] 0.11 [-0.27, 0.49] Past trip event None (A) yes Oral
Leal et al. (2019, subgroup 3 – 





Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, 
Study 1) 41 39 80 not examined 0.71 [0.27, 1.16] not examined not examined
Past trip 
event None (A) yes Oral
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, 
Study 2, whole sample – no 
manipulation at Phase 1)
101 107 208 0.65 [0.37, 0.93] 0.53 [0.26, 0.81] not examined not examined Past trip event None (A) yes Oral
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et 
al. (2019, whole sample) 97 104 201 0.11 [-0.16, 0.38] 0.13 [-0.14, 0.40] -0.09 [-0.36, 0.18] -0.14 [-0.42, 0.14]
Past trip 
event None (A) yes Oral
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et 
al. (2019, whole sample – No 
manipulation at Phase 1)
102 103 205 0.23 [-0.05, 0.51] 0.68 [0.40, 0.95] -0.34 [-0.62, -0.07] -0.33 [-0.60, -0.06] Past trip event None (A) yes Oral
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, et al. (2018) 27 26 53 0.19 [-0.34, 0.72] 0.44 [-0.10, 0.97] -0.14 [-0.67, 0.39] -0.93 [-1.47, -0.38] Past trip event None (A) yes Oral
Vrij et al. (2017, subgroup 1 – no 
manipulation) 50 50 100 0.59 [0.19, 0.98] 0.64 [0.24, 1.04] -0.23 [-0.62, 0.16] -0.49 [-0.88, -0.09]
Past trip 
event None (A) yes Oral
Vrij et al. (2017, subgroup 2 – 
Model Statement) 49 50 99 0.49 [0.09, 0.88] 0.80 [0.39, 1.21] -0.74 [-1.15, -0.34] -1.13 [-1.54, -0.72]
Past trip 
event MS (P) yes Oral
Vrij, Leal, Mann et al. (2018, 
whole sample – unexpected and 
expected questions combined)
102 102 204 0.09 [-0.18, 0.36] 0.55 [0.27, 0.83] -0.59 [-0.87, -0.31] -0.62 [-0.89, -0.34] Past trip event None (A) yes Oral
Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al. (2020, 
subgroup 1 – Arab sample) 38 38 76 0.72 [0.27, 1.18] 0.36 [-0.09, 0.80] not examined not examined Spy mission None (A) yes Oral
Vrij, Mann, et al. (2021) 47 47 94 0.70 [0.29, 1.11] 0.81 [0.40, 1.23] not examined not examined Spy mission None (A) yes Oral
Vrij, Mann, et al. (2020, whole 
sample – no manipulation at 
phase 1)
60 62 122 1.04 [0.67, 1.41] 0.77 [0.40, 1.13] not examined -0.22 [-0.57, 0.13] Spy mission None (A) yes Oral
Note. 1(P) indicates that manipulation was coded as “present”, (A) indicates that manipulation was coded as absent.
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Study Characteristics – Second Recall








N New total details New complications New common knowledge details
New self-handicapping 
strategies Manipulation
Deeb et al. (2020, subgroups 2, and 
3 - MS at T1, MS at T2, and MS at T1 
and T2)
61 62 123 0.12 [-0.23, 0.48] 0.57 [0.21, 0.92] -0.34 [-0.69, 0.01] -0.27 [-0.62, 0.08] MS (P)
Deeb et al. (2020, subgroups 1 and 4 – 
MS at T1 and control) 59 61 120 -0.04 [-0.40, 0.31] 0.54 [0.18, 0.89] -0.18 [-0.53, 0.18] -0.22 [-0.57, 0.14] None (A)
Deeb et al. (2021, subgroups 2 and 
3 - Sketching at T2 and Sketching at T1 
and T2)
61 60 121 0.52 [0.16, 0.88] 0.70 [0.34, 1.05] -0.35 [-0.70, 0.00] -0.18 [-0.53, 0.18] Sketching (P)
Deeb et al. (2021, subgroups 1 and 4 – 
Sketching at T1 and control) 61 61 122 0.34 [-0.01, 0.69] 0.49 [0.13, 0.84] -0.54 [-0.89, -0.18] -0.37 [-0.72, -0.02] None (A)
Leal et al. (2020) 44 41 85 0.26 [-0.16, 0.68] 0.76 [0.32, 1.19] did not occur frequently enough
did not occur frequently 
enough MS (P)
Vrij et al. (2020, Study 2, subgroups 1 – 
no manipulation) 35 35 70 0.45 [-0.02, 0.91] 0.31 [-0.15, 0.76] not examined not examined None (A)
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, Study 2, 
subgroups 2 – IP) 35 38 73 0.30 [-0.15, 0.74] 0.30 [-0.15, 0.74] not examined not examined IP (P)
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, Study 2, 
subgroups 3 – IP+MS) 31 34 65 0.13 [-0.35, 0.60] 0.45 [-0.03, 0.93] not examined not examined IP + MS (P)
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2018, subgroup 
1 – no manipulation) 49 51 100 -0.09 [-0.48, 0.30] 0.28 [-0.11, 0.67] -0.69 [-1.14, -0.25] not examined None (A)
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2018, subgroup 
1 – sketching) 53 51 104 0.21 [-0.17, 0.59] 0.44 [0.05, 0.82] -0.54 [-0.92, -0.15] not examined Sketching (P)
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 
(2019, whole sample) 97 104 201 0.41 [0.13, 0.69] 0.48 [0.20, 0.76] -0.46 [-0.74, -0.18] -0.37 [-0.65, -0.09] MS (P)
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. (2019, 
subgroup 1 – no manipulation) 34 35 69 0.52 [0.06, 0.99] 0.81 [0.34, 1.29] -0.61 [-1.08, -0.14] 0.00 [-0.46, 0.46] None (A)
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 
(2019, subgroups 2 and 3 combined 
– standard sketching and model 
sketching)
68 68 136 0.41 [0.07, 0.74] 0.38 [0.04, 0.71] -0.61 [-0.95, -0.27] -0.32 [-0.65, 0.01] Sketching (P)
Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al. (2018) 27 26 53 0.37 [-0.15, 0.90] 0.84 [0.29, 1.38] -0.52 [-1.05, 0.00] -0.57 [-0.64, -0.50] MS (P)
Vrij, Mann et al. (2021) 47 47 94 0.04 [-0.36, 0.44] 0.80 [0.39, 1.22] not examined not examined MS (P)
Vrij, Mann, et al. (2020,  
subgroup 1 – no manipulation) 30 32 62 0.03 [-0.45, 0.51] 0.61 [0.12, 1.11] not examined -0.27 [-0.75, 0.22] None (A)
Vrij, Mann, et al. (2020,  
subgroup 2 - sketching) 30 30 60 0.97 [0.45, 1.48] 0.18 [-0.31, 0.67] not examined -0.27 [-0.75, 0.22] Sketching (P)
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Appendix C3
Study Characteristics – Total Recall








N Unique total details Unique complications Unique common knowledge details
Unique self-handicapping 
strategies Manipulation
Deeb et al. (2020, subgroups 1, 2, and 
3 - MS at T1, MS at T2, and MS at T1 
and T2)
91 93 184 0.28 [-0.01, 0.57] 0.52 [0.23, 0.81] -0.38 [-0.67, -0.09] -0.41 [-0.70, -0.12] MS (P)
Deeb et al. (2020, subgroup 4 – control) 29 30 59 0.78 [0.27, 1.29] 0.85 [0.33, 1.37] -0.54 [-1.05, -0.04] -0.45 [-0.95, 0.04] None (A)
Deeb et al. (2021, subgroups 1, 2 and 
3 - Sketching at T1, Sketching at T2 and 
Sketching at T1 and T2)
91 90 181 0.49 [0.20, 0.78] 0.67 [0.37, 0.96] -0.56 [-0.85, -0.27] -0.45 [-0.74, -0.16] Sketching (P)
Deeb et al. (2021, subgroups 4 - control) 31 31 62 0.54 [0.05, 1.04] 0.62 [0.12, 1.10] -0.45 [-0.94, 0.03] 0.00 [0.48, -0.48] None (A)
Leal et al. (2020) 44 41 85 0.23 [-0.19, 0.64] 0.80 [0.37, 1.24] did not occur frequently enough
did not occur frequently 
enough MS (P)
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, Study 2, 
subgroups 1 – no manipulation) 35 35 70 0.62 [0.16, 1.09] 0.80 [0.33, 1.28] not examined not examined None (A)
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, Study 2, 
subgroups 2 – IP) 35 38 73 0.50 [0.05, 0.96] 0.38 [-0.08, 0.83] not examined not examined IP (P)
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020, Study 2, 
subgroups 3 – IP+MS) 31 34 65 0.67 [0.19, 1.16] -0.10 [-0.57, 0.38] not examined not examined IP + MS (P)
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 
(2019, whole sample) 97 104 201 0.32 [0.04, 0.60] 0.42 [0.15, 0.69] -0.28 [-0.55, -0.01] -0.33 [-0.66, 0.00] MS (P)
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. (2019, 
subgroup 1 – no manipulation) 34 35 69 0.52 [0.06, 0.99] 0.99 [0.50, 1.47] -0.15 [-0.61, 0.31] -0.12 [-0.58, 0.34] None (A)
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 
(2019, subgroups 2 and 3 combined 
– standard sketching and model 
sketching)
68 68 136 0.26 [-0.08, 0.59] 0.60 [0.26, 0.94] -0.67 [-1.01, -0.33] -0.48 [-0.81, -0.14] Sketching (P)
Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al. (2018) 27 26 53 0.31 [-0.22, 0.83] 0.69 [0.16, 1.22] -0.38 [-0.91, 0.14] -0.81 [-1.35, -0.27] MS (P)
Vrij, Mann, et al. (2021) 47 47 94 0.39 [-0.01, 0.78] 1.04 [0.62, 1.46] not examined not examined Several (P)
Vrij, Mann, et al. (2020, subgroup 1 –  
no manipulation) 30 32 62 0.68 [0.18, 1.18] 0.75 [0.25, 1.25] not examined -0.27 [-0.75, 0.22] None (A)
Vrij, Mann et al. (2020, subgroup 2 - 
sketching) 30 30 60 1.04 [0.51, 1.56] 0.52 [0.03, 1.02] not examined -0.27 [-0.75, 0.22] Sketching (P)
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Appendix D 
Initial Recall Data - Forest Plots
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Leal, Vrij, Deeb, Hudson, et al. 2020
Leal, Vrji, Deeb, and Kamerman 2019/Subgroup 1
Leal, Vrji, Deeb, and Kamerman 2019/Subgroup 3
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2017/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2017/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Fisher, et al. 2018
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, et al. 2020
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Fisher 2020
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Leal, Vrji, Deeb, and Kamerman 2019/Subgroup 1
Leal, Vrji, Deeb, and Kamerman 2019/Subgroup 3
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2017/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2017/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Fisher, et al. 2018
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Leal, Vrji, Deeb, and Kamerman 2019/Subgroup 1
Leal, Vrji, Deeb, and Kamerman 2019/Subgroup 3
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2017/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2017/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Fisher, et al. 2018
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Leal, Vrij, Deeb, Hudson, et al. 2020
Leal, Vrji, Deeb, and Kamerman 2019/Subgroup 1
Leal, Vrji, Deeb, and Kamerman 2019/Subgroup 3
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2017/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2017/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Fisher, et al. 2018
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, et al. 2020
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
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Appendix F
Second Recall Data - Forest Plots
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Leal, Vrij, Deeb, Hudson, et al. 2020
Vrji, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 1
Vrji, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 3
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2018/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2018/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Fisher 2020
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2018/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2018/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 2
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Leal, Vrij, Deeb, Hudson, et al. 2020
Vrji, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 1
Vrji, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 3
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2018/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Dalton, et al. 2018/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Fisher 2020
Overall (random-effects model)
New total details
New common knowledge details
New complications
New self-handicapping strategies
 ES 95% CI N
 ES 95% CI N  ES 95% CI N
 ES 95% CI N
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Appendix H
Total Recall Data - Forest Plots
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Leal, Vrij, Deeb, Hudson, et al. 2020
Vrji, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 1
Vrji, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 3
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Fisher 2020
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Leal, Vrij, Deeb, Hudson, et al. 2020
Vrji, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 1
Vrji, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020 (Study 2)/Subgroup 3
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Fisher 2020
Overall (random-effects model)
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb et al. 2020/Subgroup 2
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 1
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, and Burkhardt 2020/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Debb, et al. 2019
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, Jo, et al. 2019/Subgroup 2
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, and Harvey 2018
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 1
Vrij, Mann, Leal, Fisher, and Deeb 2020/Subgroup 2
Overall (random-effects model)
Unique total details
Unique common knowledge details
Unique complications
Unique self-handicapping strategies
 ES 95% CI N
 ES 95% CI N  ES 95% CI N
 ES 95% CI N
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There is some debate about whether the frequentist and the 
Bayesian approaches should be employed together. On the one 
hand, it has been suggested that the two frameworks might be 
epistemologically incompatible (Mayo, 1996, 2018). Indeed, whilst 
the frequentist approach makes use of conditional distributions of 
the data given the hypothesis, the Bayesian makes use of probability 
for the data as well as for the hypotheses. On the other hand, it is 
believed that it might be fruitful to employ both, and there are indeed 
examples where this has been done (Hong et al., 2013; Wu et al., 
2020). Indeed, a comparison of the two frameworks can shed light on 
the consistency of the results when applying different methods. The 
merits here are that it is possible to explore two different answers to 
a same question, each with its own peculiarities.
We carried out a Bayesian meta-analysis for the following reasons. 
First, with the Bayesian approach there is no need to select either 
a fixed-effect or a random-effects model as it accounts for model 
uncertainty. Hence, the Bayesian approach can be applied when there 
is no certainty about heterogeneity (in contrast to a random-effects 
model which presumes that it is non-zero), which can be particularly 
the case when there is no solid background to assume the presence 
(vs. absence) of heterogeneity.
Second, it permits to explore the plausibility of our a priori choices 
concerning the application of either the fixed effect (for common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies relative to second 
and total recalls) or random-effects (all remaining analyses) standard 
meta-analyses as outlined in the main text of this article after taking 
into account the observed data.
Third, in addition to the significance testing of the global effect 
size obtained via the standard meta-analytic approach, a Bayesian 
meta-analysis returns a Bayes factor, which provides the amount of 
evidence in support of the alternative hypothesis (the presence of 
an effect) against the null hypothesis (the absence of an effect). We 
interpreted Bayes factors cut-offs as outlined by Jeffreys (1961): values 
between 1 and 3 indicate weak evidence for H1, values between 3 
and 10 indicate substantial evidence for H1, values between 10 and 
20 indicate strong evidence for H1, and values beyond 20 indicate 
very strong evidence for H1. Vice versa, values between 1/3 and 1 
indicate weak evidence for H0, scores between 1/3 and 1/10 indicate 
substantial evidence for H0 etc.
Fourth, a Bayesian approach provides a posterior distribution of 
the global effect size, whose utility is twofold: i) the probability of 
each value of the global effect size can be calculated and is shown 
graphically and ii) future research on the topic can use the resulting 
posterior distribution of both the effect size and of τ as an informative 
prior distribution. Therefore, any new experiment can build on 
previous evidence in a cumulative manner.
Last, with the Bayesian approach it is possible to obtain the 
probability of the presence of an effect (in our case, a difference 
between truth tellers and lie tellers in the examined variables), rather 
than a dichotomic answer “significant/not significant”.
We conducted a Bayesian model averaging meta-analysis (Gronau 
et al., 2020) and used default priors as recommended by Gronau et al. 
(2017): A Cauchy prior with scale 1/  centred at zero for the effect 
size µ, and an inverse-gamma (1, 0.15) prior for between studies 
standard deviation τ. With this procedure, four Bayesian meta-
analysis models are considered: (a) a fixed-effect null-hypothesis, 
(b) a fixed-effect alternative hypothesis, (c) a random-effects null 
hypothesis, and (d) a random-effects alternative hypothesis. The four 
models above are obtained by fixing at zero both µ and τ (model a), 
only τ (model b), only µ (model c), or neither (model d). Then, an 
inclusion Bayes factor for the presence of an effect is obtained by 
contrasting the two models that predict an effect (µ ≠ 0, models b and 
d, H1) at the numerator of the formula to the two models that predict 
a null effect (µ = 0, models a and c, H0) at the denominator,
BF10 effect = 
p (model b|data) + p (model d|data)  p (model b) + p (model d)
p (model a|data) + p (model c|data)  p (model a) + p (model c)
with the left-hand side of the formula relating to posterior 
inclusion odds and the right-hand side of the formula relating to 
the prior inclusion odds. In essence, a Bayesian model averaged 
meta-analysis: i) can quantify the evidence in support for the 
presence of an effect while accounting for uncertainty relative to 
choosing a fixed effect or a random-effects meta-analysis, ii) can 
provide evidence for the presence/absence of between-studies 
heterogeneity, and iii) returns posterior odds for each of the four 
models once the observer data are taken into account. The higher a 
posterior odd, the more plausible a specific model.
Results
We had 12 meta-analyses, the result of three interviews (first 
recall, second recall and total recall), and four dependent variables 
(total details, complications, common knowledge details, and self-
handicapping strategies). When conducting the standard meta-
analyses, we opted (a priori) for a fixed-effect model when analysing 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies 
concerning “second recall” and “total recall” (four analyses), and a 
random-effects model for the remaining eight analyses. However, 
especially when research on a specific topic is still in its development, 
it is not always possible to rule out uncertainty concerning the correct 
model selection (fixed-effect vs. random-effects).
A series of Bayesian model averaging meta-analyses was 
conducted to explore such uncertainty and to evaluate our choices. 
The results showed that we chose, a priori, the model with higher 
posterior probabilities in five out of 12 cases. The seven cases where 
the analyses showed that the model we chose was less probable than 
its alternative (Table J1, superscript 1) concerned: i) complications in 
initial and second and total recall, ii) total details in second and total 
recall, iii) common knowledge details in initial recall, and iv) self-
Table J1. Posterior Model Probabilities for the Outcome Variables
Posterior models probabilities
Total details Complications Common knowledge details Self-handicapping strategies
Model IR SR1 TR1 IR1 SRa TR1 IR1 SR TR IR SR1 TR
Fixed H0 1.842e -21 9.723e -7 1.738e -15 5.322e -37 2.908e -23 1.808e -28 1.764e -11 8.241e -13 3.376e -9 2.419e -11 9.163e -59 2.422e -7 
Fixed H1 0.047 0.613 0.739 0.558 0.802 0.560 0.557 0.776 0.714 0.066 0.016 0.765 
Random H0 4.688e  -5 0.001 1.058e  -6 4.925e  -9 1.766e  -8 8.817e  -7 2.648e  -4 2.369e  -5 8.725e -4 0.013 0.017 8.222e -4 
Random H1 0.953 0.386 0.261 0.442 0.198 0.440 0.443 0.224 0.285 0.921 0.967 0.234 
Note. 1Indicates that the posterior probability of the model we selected (fixed-effect vs. random-effects) was lower than that of the model we did not select. For example, for 
the meta-analysis concerning new total details (second recall) we ran a random-effects standard meta-analysis, but the posterior model probabilities indicate that a fixed-effect 
model was the most plausible (≈61% probability) after having taken into account the observed data than the random-effects model (≈38% probability). IR = Initial recall, SR = 
Second recall, TR = Total recall.
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handicapping strategies in second recall. For i), ii), and iii) the fixed-
effect model obtained higher posterior probability than the random-
effects model we chose. However, Table J2 shows that the Bayes factor 
for the presence of heterogeneity ranged from BF10 τ = 0.25 to BF10 τ 
= 0.79, indicating only weak to moderate evidence for the absence 
of heterogeneity. Due to this uncertainty, a model averaging analysis 
is particularly appropriate. For iv) the random-effects model was 
more plausible (≈96.7 probability) after observing the data than the 
fixed-effect model (≈1.6% probability) we chose. In this case, there 
was strong evidence for the presence of heterogeneity (BF10 τ = 61.26).
Concerning the presence of an effect, Table J2 shows very 
strong to extreme support for H1 for the four outcome variables 
(total details, complications, common knowledge details, and self-
handicapping strategies), indicating that there is evidence for the 
hypothesis that such variables can discriminate truth tellers from 
lie tellers (H1). Put differently, the data were more likely under the 
alternative hypothesis than under the null hypothesis to a large 
extent, supporting Hypotheses 1 to 3. Table J2 also shows that 
complications obtained the highest Bayes factors.
Discussion
On the one hand, the results of this Bayesian meta-analysis 
reflect the conclusions obtained via the frequentist framework 
(Table J2). First, complications, common knowledge details, and self-
handicapping strategies can discriminate truth tellers from lie tellers, 
as the presence of an effect was always more likely than the lack of it. 
Second, via the Bayesian meta-analysis, complications emerged as a 
stronger veracity indicator than the other two variables, as the Bayes 
factor analyses show (Table J2).
On the other hand, results concerning heterogeneity were less 
clear-cut. The Bayesian framework found the posterior probabilities 
of the examined models generally supporting the lack of between-
study variance. Indeed, after observing the data, model b (τ fixed at 
0) received higher posterior probability than model d (τ ≠ 0) in most 
cases- except for self-handicapping strategies in initial and second 
recall. Yet, as Table J2 shows, the Bayes factors of τ were mostly 
inconclusive, indicating that at this stage it is difficult to draw any 
conclusion concerning the degree of between-study variance. In this 
regard, the Bayesian analysis reported here further strengthens the 
idea that future studies are needed to explore more in depth why the 
analysed studies seemed to show low heterogeneity, and whether 
this is actually the case. For example, futures studies could compare 
the results of different meta-analysis models obtained by varying the 
prior distribution of τ.
Notwithstanding this, it is possible that the results obtained here 
are due to method invariance across experiments, as all studies come 
from Vrij’s lab and imply a consistent coding system and a shared 
research design.
In conclusion, it is essential to understand why the selected 
studies showed no heterogeneity, as well as to explore the external 
validity of the obtained results, by answering questions as: Do 
complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies still work in scenarios that are different from those 
included in this meta-analysis? Is the lack of heterogeneity due 
to method invariance and to the fact that all studies come from 
the same lab or to other reasons? And, lastly, do the conclusions 
obtained here apply to real-life material? We hope that future 
studies will shed light on the potential of the complications 
approach.
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Table J2. Effect Size Estimates, Standard Deviations, 95% Credible Intervals, and Bayes Factors
Averaged model
Effect size posterior µ Effect size posterior SD Effect size 95% CI BF10 µ BF10 τ
Initial recall
Total details  .45 .07 [.32, .58] 21329.45 20.40
Complications  .57 .05 [.48, .67] 2.03 e +8 0.79
Common knowledge details -.39 .06 [-.50, -.27] 3774.82 0.79
Self-handicapping strategies -.36 .08 [-.53, -.20] 74.08 14.19
Second recall
New total details  .28 .05 [.17, .38] 771.06 0.63
New complications  .51 .05 [.41, .60] 5.66 e +7 0.25
New common knowledge details -.46 .06 [-.58, -.34] 42217.14 0.29
New self-handicapping strategies -.34 .08 [-.49, -.17] 58.33 61.26
Total recall
Unique details  .45 .05 [.33, .55] 944736.14 0.35
Unique complications  .61 .06 [.49, .72] 1.13 e +6 0.79
Unique common knowledge details -.42 .07 [-.56, -.29] 1145.19 0.40
Unique self-handicapping strategies -.37 .06 [-.49, -.24] 1214.91 0.30
